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The Relationship Between Executive and Judiciary:
The State Department as the Supreme
Court of International Law
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1810 a warship in Napoleon's navy seized the American
schooner Exchange on the high seas and escorted her into a
French port where she was fitted out for war. In due course,
the vessel came to anchor in the port of Philadelphia. Her
American owners, seeking to recover what they believed theirs,
filed a libel against the vessel in the Federal District Court of
Pennsylvania. The Government of the United States filed with
the couft a "suggestion" that the schooner Exchange was a
public vessel of the Emperor of France, the decree of Napoleon
having divested the plaintiffs of their title. Accordingly, the
United States requested that the vessel be released from custody
on the ground that she was immune from the court's jurisdiction. The district court, without further proceedings, ordered
the Exchange released and this action was affirmed on appeal
to the United States Supreme Court in a noted opinion of Chief

Justice Marshall.1
The apparently conclusive effect 2 which was given to the
executive "suggestion" in the case of The Schooner Exchange
has survived global bipolarization and the development of thermonuclear weapons and remains today a guiding principle in
ordering the relationship between the Department of State, representing the executive, and the courts. In the 156 years since
the Exchange sailed out of Philadelphia, the conditions and
extent of international intercourse and the position of the United
States in the world have changed so extensively that the
continuing vitality of a judicial attitude of deference to the
executive in cases involving foreign parties is remarkable. This
Note will examine the relationship between the State Department and the courts with a view toward determining whether
1. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812).
2. The actual degree of reliance by the Court on the executive
"suggestion" is unclear in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion. He appears
to have rested his decision on general principles of international law
and an evaluation of the deleterious effect on Franco-American relations which a judgment in favor of plaintiffs would have. It is only in
later cases that the executive suggestion is said to have been given conclusive effect by the Chief Justice. See, e.g., New York & Cuba Mail
S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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contemporary international affairs and the national interest require a judicial shift from the present deferential attitude to a
more neutral and independent posture. In the interest of analysis and practicality, the discussion will confine itself to the
three broad classes of cases in which the State Department has
displayed the greatest propensity for intervention: sovereign or
diplomatic immunity, recognition and act of state, and treaty
interpretation.
II. SOVEREIGN OR DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
The great majority of cases in which the State Department
has directly or indirectly intervened in court proceedings have
involved requests by foreign parties that they be held immune
from the courts' jurisdiction. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as its name implies, was born in an era when monarchy
was the predominant form of government in Western civilization. At that time the separation of powers concept was unknown and the courts were dependent upon and subordinate to
the royal will. The subjection of a monarch to the jurisdiction
of an institution which he himself, or his foreign counterpart,
had created and fostered was thought to be an intolerable affront
to the dignity of the crown.3 In this context the practice of the
executive "suggestion," as seen in The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon,4 had its origin.5
The era of the absolute monarchy has of course passed and
with it, for many of the nations in which it once prospered, has
gone the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 6 In the United States
3. See generally W. MOORE, ACT OF STATE IN ENGLISH LAW (1906).
Despite this rigid attitude towards the immunity of the crown, it was
clear that redress of some grievances was available through international arbitration or diplomacy.
4. 11U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
5. See W. MooRE, supra note 3, at 18, in which the author quotes
the following words of King James of England:
Encroach not upon the prerogative of the Crown. If there falls
out a question that concerns my prerogative or mystery of
State, deal not with it till you consult with the King or his
Council, or both, for they are transcendent matters .... That
which concerns the mystery of the king's power is not lawful to
be disputed; for that is to wade into the weakness of princes,
and to take away the mystical reverence that belongs to them
that sit in the throne of God.
Id. at 18. It should be noted that this article is only concerned with
sovereign immunity on an international, as opposed to an intranational,
level although some of the historical background applies to both.
6. Lyons, Conclusiveness of the Statements of the ExecutiveContinental and Latin American Practice, 25 BRIT. YB. INT'. L. 180
(1948). See also Moore, The Role of the State Department in Judicial
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the pervasive reach which the doctrine once had has been circumscribed not by judicial recognition of the demise of absolute
monarchy, but rather by executive policy.7 The lead of the
executive branch in limiting the scope of sovereign immunity
results from the consistent reluctance of American courts to
involve themselves in cases requiring the application of international law. This reluctance, in turn, has been fostered partially by the willingness of the State Department to intervene
and partially by the failure of both the State Department and
the courts to make a serious and conscious effort to delineate
Cases involving
their respective spheres of responsibility."
requests for sovereign immunity eloquently illustrate this
confusion.
In Ex parte Peru," a Cuban sugar company filed a libel
against a Peruvian vessel anchored in an American port. The
dispute arose over the alleged breach by the Peruvian ship of a
contract to haul a load of sugar for the Cuban company. The
government of Peru, claiming that it owned and operated the
vessel, asked the State Department to intervene on its behalf
by suggesting to the court that it "recognize and allow" Peru's
claim to immunity from jurisdiction.'0 The State Department
complied and filed its suggestion with the district court. That
court, however, ignored the views of the executive and, holding
that Peru had waived her immunity, proceeded to the merits.
Peru then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition
Proceedings, 31 FoRDHAm L. REv. 277 (1962), in which the author points
out that the courts in most countries of the Western hemisphere decide
questions of sovereign immunity according to general principles of international law rather than on the basis of executive preference.
7. Thus, in 1952 the State Department, speaking through its legal
advisor Jack Tate, gave notice that in the future it would adhere to the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. This theory distinguishes between the public acts (jure imperii) of a foreign nation and those of a
private or commercial nature (jure gestionis). Immunity is granted
only for litigation arising out of the former. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL.
984 (1952).
8. Contra, International Law in National Courts, THnRD SumnmE
CONFERENCE ON INT'L L. 4 (1960) (remarks of Mr. Yingling representing
the State Department).
9. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
10. When a foreign nation is being sued in a United States court
and believes it is entitled to immunity from jurisdiction, it can simply
write to the legal office of the Department of State requesting that office to inform the court that immunity should be granted. For a detailed description of this procedure, see Lyons, The Conclusiveness of
the 'Suggestion' and Certificate of the American State Department, 24
BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 116 (1947). See also Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522
(1921).
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against further adjudication by the lower court. The Court
granted the writ on the ground of what it termed "an overriding
principle of law:"'1
That principle is that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction, by the seizure and detention of the property of a friendly sovereign, as to embarrass the executive
arm of the Govern12
ment in conducting foreign relations.
The Court indicated that the State Department's "suggestion" of
immunity was entitled to conclusive respect as it represented a
determination by the government branch responsible for foreign
affairs that further court proceedings would interfere with the
discharge of that responsibility. 13
More recent decisions in lower federal courts have reaffirmed if not extended the approach to executive suggestions
adopted in Ex parte Peru. In New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company v. Republic of Korea, 4 plaintiff contracted with
defendant to ship a load of rice to Pusan, Korea. While unloading the cargo, plaintiff's vessel was allegedly damaged through
the negligence of defendant's agents. Plaintiff sued out a writ
of foreign attachment pursuant to which defendant's funds in
New York banks were attached. Defendant, armed with a
"suggestion" of immunity from the State Department, 5 appeared specially and moved for dismissal. Following the executive's lead the court vacated the attachment and dismissed the
complaint. The opinion tersely stated that a foreign nation's
claim for immunity presents a political rather than a judicial
question. The court continued:
Lest an untoward incident disturb amicable relations between
the two sovereigns, it has long been established that the
Court's proper function is to enforce the political decisions of
our Department of State on such matters. This course entails no
abrogation of judicial power; it is a self-imposed restraint to
avoid embarrassment of the executive in the conduct of foreign
affairs.16

11. 318 U.S. at 588.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 589.
14.

132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).

15. The State Department requested the Attorney General to inform the court that,
•

.

. under international law property of a foreign government

is immune from attachment and seizure, and that the principle

is not affected by a letter dated May 19, 1952 [the "Tate letter,"
supra note 7] . . . in which the Department of State indicated
its intention to be governed by the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in disposing of requests from foreign governments that immunity from suit be suggested in individual cases.

Id. at 685.
16.

Id. at 686.
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These two cases typify the degree to which American courts
defer to the executive when confronted with unequivocal state-

ments of State Department preference concerning the disposition
of pending litigation. 17 When faced with State Department
communications which are equivocal or ambiguous, the courts
strain to find an implied executive preference on which to base
their decisions. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman 18 involved a
suit by an American shipowner for damage to his vessel caused
by the alleged negligence of a Mexican ship. The court was
faced with a State Department "suggestion" to the effect that
the Department had "accepted as true" the Mexican government's claim to ownership of the vessel. Mexico argued that
this was enough to warrant dismissal on the ground of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court of the United States, on
the other hand, found within the State Department communication the implication that immunity should not be granted. In
the course of its opinion the Court said:
More important, and we think controlling in the present circumstances, is the fact that, despite numerous opportunities like
the present to recognize immunity from suit of a vessel owned
and not possessed by a foreign government, this government
has failed to do so. We can only conclude that it is the national policy not to extend the immunity in the manner now
suggested, and that it is the duty of the courts, in a matter so
intimately associated with our foreign policy and which may profoundly affect it, not to enlarge an immunity to an extent
which the government, although often asked, has not seen fit
to recognize.' 9
17. See also Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); Hellenic
Lines, Ltd. v. Embassy of South Viet Nam, 275 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Republic of China v. Pang-Tsu Mow, 101 F. Supp. 646 (D.D.C.
1951); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Netherlands East Indies Gov't, 75 F. Supp. 48
(S.D.N.Y. 1947); Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d
1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Knocklong Corp. v. Kingdom of
Afghanistan, 6 Misc. 2d 700, 167 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Cty. Ct. 1957); Frazier v.
Hanover Bank, 204 Misc. 922, 119 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1953), afFd, 119
N.Y.S.2d 918 (App. Div. 1953).
18. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
19. Id. at 38. For further examples of the confused approach of
courts to equivocal State Department suggestions, see Ocean Transport
Co. v. Government of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703
(E.D. La. 1967); The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1946);
Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, Nat'l Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 855, 199 N.Y.S.2d
797 (Sup. Ct. 1960); United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 294 N.Y. 265,
62 N.E.2d 64 (Ct. App. 1945); Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N.Y. 362,
24 N.E.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1939). See also Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo,
36 F. Supp. 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) where the court was at such a loss to
find guidance from a State Department communication that it took
the initiative and requested direct clarification from that Department
on the issue of whether sovereign immunity should be allowed.
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It is clear from these decisions that the relationship between
the courts and the State Department in cases involving requests
for sovereign immunity is one of almost total subjugation to
executive determinations. Support for this accommodation between the two branches is not confined to the courts. A number
of respected commentators have voiced approval of such judicial
deference. It is argued by some that as long as the executive
bases its decision on legal principle rather than "shifting motives
of policy," the question of sovereign immunity is best resolved
in the State Department, where the bulk of expertise in international law is lodged. 20 Others have found comfort in the fact
that the preliminary determination of whether or not to retain
jurisdiction over a party asserting immunity is in itself an
exercise of judicial jurisdiction. 21 The argument which is most
often voiced in support of the present relationship between the
courts and the State Department is that judicial subordination
22
in this area is a natural offspring of the separation of powers.
Those who favor this position contend that the American system
One commentator said of this decision:
It seems clear from this important ... decision that the Court
is reaching a stage where it is no longer accepting the bland
disavowal of the Executive in matters of immunity. The State
Department must lead and the Court will follow, the Court says
in effect; and if the Department will not give a lead then the
Court will find one somehow in the Department's own documents.
Lyons, The Conclusiveness of the 'Suggestion! and Certificate of the
American State Department, 24 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 116, 134-35 (1947).
20. Lyons, supra note 19, at 146-47. See also Bilder, The Office

of the Legal Advisers: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign Af-

fairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633, 672-73 (1962).
21. See, e.g. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 51
(1933), in which the author says:
It is the general rule that courts will not decide cases against
foreign states or sovereigns without their consent, and that in
addition certain property, persons, and acts appertaining to sovereign states are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the courts.
Here, then, is a true judicial incompetency. But even here
there is an initial exercise of judicial jurisdiction, for the vital
question of whether there is or is not immunity is decided by
the court.
See also Deik, The Plea of Sovereign Immunity and the New York
Court of Appeals, 40 COLuM. L. REv. 453, 462 (1940).
22. See M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLI=CAL FouNDATIONs
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW passim (1961) [hereinafter cited as KAPLA-N &
KATZENBACH]; International Law in National Courts in THIRD SUMMER
(remarks of Mr. Yingling); Bilder,
CONFERENCE ON INT'L L. 4 (1960)

The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and
Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633, 668-69 (1962); Cardozo, Judicial

Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper?, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 472 (1963);
Deik, supra note 21, at 464; Moore, The Role of the State Department
in JudicialProceedings,31 FORDHAM L. REv. 277, 299 (1962).
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of government, as it has developed, has increasingly cast the
burden of promulgating and executing national foreign policy
on the executive branch. To discharge properly the responsibility which has devolved upon it, the executive must have a
free hand, uncluttered by the spectre of judicial contradictions.
It is further contended that the dynamics of world politics render
insignificant the piecemeal, fortuitous adjudications by domestic
23
tribunals.
Those who oppose the present deferential attitude in the
area of sovereign immunity argue that automatic acceptance of
executive determinations deprives the wronged plaintiff of his
day in

court.24

It

is also argued that the national interest

would best be served by the development and application of
substantive norms of international law by an independent judiciary.25 The development of consistent rules of conduct, it is
urged, is vital to the preservation of world peace. The State
Department is not the institution through which such a development can best be accomplished. 26 Also, foreign parties denied
immunity by the executive have no assurance that their assertions were accorded the kind of impartial consideration which
proceedings in open court afford. Thus, the ability to predict
23. See, e.g., KAPLAN & KATZENBACH at 14; Bilder, supra note 22,
at 668.
24. See P. JEssuP, THE USE or INTmNATIONAL LAW 83 (1959);
Franck, The Courts, The State Department and National Policy: A Criterion for JudicialAbdication, 44 Mmnm. L. REv. 1101, 1123 (1960); Moore,
The Role of the State Department in Judicial Proceedings, 31 FORDCWAM
L. REv. 277, 279 (1962); Note, The Sovereigns Immunity and Private
Property: A Due Process Problem, 50 GEO. L.J. 284 passim (1961).
Contra, Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day
in Court,67 HARv. L. REv. 608, 614 (1954):
The executive branch must, of course, be assiduous in avoiding trespass on the domain of the judiciary. Sovereign immunity, and its subordinate counterpart, diplomatic immunity, however, are part of the mechanism of carrying on amicable relations with other countries. They are among the elements that
comprise the comity of nations. The Courts quite rightly should
look to the executive branch for guidance on the political question of what is necessary in the interest of good relations with
other friendly powers.
25. See, e.g., Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of its

Functions?,40 AM. J. INTL L. 168, 171-72 (1946).

26. See, e.g., Lauterpacht, The Problem of JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States, 28 Brarr. YB. INT'L L. 220, 240 (1951) where the
author says:
The normal exercise of jurisdiction of courts in actions against
foreign states may in itself remove a frequent source of friction and resentment. From the point of view of securing a
friendly atmosphere in international relations judicial remedies
against foreign states may be preferable to diplomatic action
necessitated by the refusal of those states to submit to jurisdiction.
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the consequences of dealing with the United States or its citizens
will be impaired, thereby reducing the confidence which is vital
27
to international intercourse.
The opposition to the present relationship seems warranted.
In 1812 when Chief Justice Marshall was confronted with the
first direct executive intervention, 28 the United States was a new
nation, uncertain of her international stature and anxious to
make and preserve alliances with the established and powerful
nations of Western Europe. It was clear in the context of The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon29 that the national interest in
avoiding the slightest affront to Napoleon's France outweighed
the loss of a vessel by an American citizen. Today, the stature
and strength of the United States in the world community is
unquestioned. Our enemies fear us and our allies to a large
degree depend upon us. Yet the State Department and the
courts continue to interact in a manner which suggests the
same nervous uncertainty which quite understandably controlled
Chief Justice Marshall's decision in The Schooner Exchange.
The power of the United States logically compels the realization
that the courts of this nation can bring foreign parties before
them to answer for their wrongs. Indeed, the State Department
must have taken this into consideration when it announced a
shift to the restrictive policy of sovereign immunity.3 0 Yet the
courts still look to the executive when foreign parties are before
them, and the executive still responds with conclusive determinations.3 ' The anomalous nature of the present relationship
is further evidenced by the criteria which the State Department
claims to use in deciding whether to "recognize and allow"
claims to immunity. In almost every case in which the State
Department has seen fit to rationalize its decision, it has said
that the result was reached by applying international law.32
27. See, e.g., P. JEssup, Tim UsE OF INTERNATiONAL LAW (1959);
Dickinson, The Law of Nations as National Law: "Political Questions,"
104 U. PA. L. REv. 451, 478-79 (1956); Moore, The Role of the State
Department in Judicial Proceedings,31 FORDHAm L. REV. 277, 299 (1962);
Note, Judicial Deference to the State Department on InternationalLegal

Issues, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 79, 80 (1948).

28. See note 1 supra,and accompanying text.
29. 11U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
30. See note 7 supra.
31. See note 17 supra.
32. See, e.g., Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978, 982 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 1965); New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea,
132 F. Supp. 684, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Knocklong Corp. v. Kingdom of
Afghanistan, 6 Misc. 2d 700, 167 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286-87 (Nassau County
Ct. 1957).
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Nothing has been found either in the Constitution or any Act of
Congress which empowers an executive agency to decide a case
or controversy by application of international law. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has explicitly stated that that is one of its
33
functions.
When viewed in light of the origins of the deferential attitude,34 the present relationship fails even more abjectly to pass
muster. A close reading of the cases reveals not a single fact
situation where, even if the court had utterly failed to ascertain
and apply the proper international substantive norm of immunity, the damage to our foreign relations would have been of such
proportions as to justify what is virtually a permanent removal
of this class of cases from the courts. 35 Furthermore, the nature
of the judicial process, with its long delays, is such that the
cases which could provoke international furor and crisis simply
do not reach domestic courts.3 6 In light of the arguments of the
commentators and the above considerations, the relationship between the State Department and the courts in the area of
sovereign immunity is in serious need of readjustment.

III. RECOGNITION AND ACT OF STATE
A. RECOGNITONq
The same deferential attitude found in the sovereign immunity cases is also present, to a somewhat lesser degree, in
cases involving recognition as it affects a foreign litigant.3 7 The
33. International law is a part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations.
The Paquete Habana, 176 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
34. See note 29 supra,and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., note 63 infra.
36. See KAPLAx & KATZENBACH at 16. "But rarely can courts intrude into areas of political importance. Given a genuine political crisis, courts are likely to capitulate or to be bypassed." Id.
37. The term "recognition," although used in numerous contexts,
generally connotes the acceptance by one state of the political existence
of another, and the related decision to establish relations with it. It
is universally conceded that the formal act of extending recognition to
a nation or its government is a purely executive prerogative. See
generally 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 3 (1940).
One commentator has suggested that there is a legal duty to recognize
a state or government which meets certain specific prerequisites. H.
LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

passim (1947).
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case of The Maret 38 concerned a vessel, owned by an Estonian
shipping company, which was requisitioned by the United States
government for national defense purposes. As compensation
for the temporary loss of the ship, the United States set up a
fund. Meanwhile, Russia had overrun Estonia and had nationalized her companies including the one which owned the Maret.
Both the U.S.S.R. and the former directors of the Estonian
company sought to recover the government fund. The State
Department informed the court that it recognized neither the
absorption of Estonia by the U.S.S.R. nor the legality of that
government's nationalization decrees. The court awarded the
fund to the former directors, saying:
Nonrecognition of a foreign sovereign and nonrecognition of its
decrees are to be deemed to be as essential a part of the
power confided by the Constitution to 9the Executive for the
conduct of foreign affairs as recognition.3

The court, faced with an unequivocal expression of preference
by the executive, did not attempt to judge the validity of the
execunationalization under international law even though the
40
tive's assertion of illegality implied the use of such law.

The degree of deference accorded the executive communication in The Maret is somewhat greater than that used in other
recognition cases. The more common approach is illustrated by
The Ambrose Light.41 In that case, the American navy seized a
vessel operated by parties in revolt against the government of
Colombia. The vessel was escorted to port, where she was
libelled on the ground of piracy. The rebel defendants, seeking
the release of the vessel, claimed that the seizure was illegal
because the State Department had recognized the existence of a
38. 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944).
39. Id. at 442. See also Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S.

Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1951) where the court

said:
We are of opinion that when the executive branch of the Government has determined upon a foreign policy, which can be and
is ascertained, and the non-recognition of specific foreign decrees is deliberate and is shown to be part of that policy, such
non-recognition must be given effect by the courts.
40. In fact, the status of nationalizations under international law is
highly uncertain. Those nations whose citizens are injured by foreign
nationalizations usually claim that such acts are illegal unless accompanied by compensation and unless they are nondiscriminatory and
nonretaliatory. On the other hand, the nationalizing state, especially if
underdeveloped, is prone to contend that its act is valid notwithstanding
failure to compensate, if it serves the national interest. See generaliy
W. BIsHop, INTERNAIONAL LAw, CASES AND MATERIALS 677-95 (2d ed.
1962).
41. 25 F. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1885). See also Guaranty Trust Co. v.
United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
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state of belligerancy 42 between the Colombian government and
the faction of which defendants were members. In support of
this contention, defendants introduced a letter from the State
Department recognizing that a state of war existed in Colombia.
The court, taking pains to weigh the significance of the executive communication, concluded that recognition of a state of war,
as a matter of law, confers upon each party to the conflict the
status of a belligerent. After determining this the court continued: "[T]he conclusion of law follows that their vessels of
war cannot be regarded as piratical." 43 Accordingly, the seizure
was held illegal and the vessel was ordered released. It will be
observed here that the court reached the result desired by the
executive branch without abandoning its duty to apply law to
facts. The court considered the contents of the State Department letter as a fact relevant to the disposition of the case. It is,
of course, likely that the implications of the letter had considerable influence on the outcome, but the fact remains that the
opinion evidences a genuine attempt to apply ascertainable
norms of the international law of belligerency to particular
44

facts.

Where State Department communications on matters of rec42. The formal recognition of the existence of a state of belligerency carries with it a number of important legal consequences. For
example, it confers upon the parties recognized the rights of blockade,
visitation, and search and seizure on the high seas. The Three Friends,
166 U.S. 1 (1896).
43. 25 F. 408, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
44. See also Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149,
147 N.E. 703 (1925). The New York court has been known to take
an independent and even contentious view of State Department communications. In Anderson v. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289
N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942), the issue was the effect to be given a
decree of the Netherlands government in exile purporting to freeze its
citizens' assets in the United States pending the end of World War II.
The State Department filed a "Suggestion of Interest" with the court
stating that it was the policy of the United States government to give
full effect to the decrees of the recognized government in exile, and that
if given effect, that policy should be dispositive of the issues involved
in the case. The court replied:
We need not consider now whether the Department of State by
"formulation" of its public policy as to the effect of the decree
could change the judicial question determined by the court below into a "political question" which the courts are not empowered to decide or whether the Department of State can in
that manner create a public policy of the United States which
supersedes and renders immaterial any public policy of a State.
289 N.Y. at 20; 43 N.E.2d at 507. See also Upright v. Mercury Business
Machs. Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1962). Contra,
Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
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ognition are equivocal or evidence executive indifference to the
outcome of pending litigation, courts display the same tendency
to grope for executive preference as was observed in the sovereign immunity cases.45 In Republic of Iraq v. First National
City Bank,46 the issue was title to funds in defendant bank
deposited by King Faisal II of Iraq. In 1958 a revolution overthrew the royal family and King Faisal was executed. The
revolutionary government, duly recognized by the United States,
passed a decree purporting to confiscate all royal assets including those on deposit in defendant bank. Pursuant to the decree
plaintiff sought to withdraw the funds. Defendant, uncertain
about the validity of the confiscatory decree and desirous of
avoiding double liability threatened by the claims of Faisal's
heirs, resisted. The State Department communicated to the
court:
While the recognition of and maintenance of diplomatic relations with a foreign government are political matters within the
province of the executive department of the Federal Government, questions regarding the administration of estates and the
determination of rights and interests in property in the United
States ordinarily are matters
for the determination by the courts
4
of competent jurisdiction. 7
The court, in holding for the defendant, looked long and hard
at the State Department's communication. It came to the conclusion that the act of recognition alone was not a manifestation
of executive desire that the confiscatory decree be given extraterritorial effect.48 Accordingly, the court gave controlling
effect to the principle that "[c] onfiscation without repayment is
repugnant to our fundamental concept of justice." 49 The opinion
reveals no attempt to inquire into the nature of the funds on
deposit in defendant bank. Thus the possibility that they represented public moneys deposited by the King for the purpose
45.

See note 17 supra, and accompanying text. See also Land

Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 109 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1940).

46. 241 F. Supp. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
47. 241 F. Supp. at 573.
48. Id. The court continued as follows:
Where, as here, there is no such specific agreement, and where
the Department of State has expressly left the question open
for decision by the court, it cannot be said that there is any
federal executive policy in favor of enforcing the title acquired
by confiscation.
Id. at 574. This case can be distinguished from the Act of State cases
discussed below because the Iraqi decree attempted to affect property
located outside the territorial boundaries of Iraq. The Act of State
doctrine applies only to foreign decrees which affect purely internal
property or rights. See note 51 infra, and accompanying text.
49. Id. at 574.
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of discharging Iraqi obligations, although seemingly relevant,
was not alluded to by the court.
As the cases discussed above indicate, the question of the
effect to be given an executive act of recognition almost invariably arises in cases involving title to property in the United
States as affected by the decrees or act of foreign sovereigns or
parties. Thus, cases involving recognition deal mainly with the
issue of whether extraterritorial effect should be accorded foreign acts. Cases involving the act of state doctrine differ only
in the fact that they involve the issue of whether foreign acts or
decrees should be recognized as effective within the territorial
boundaries of the enacting state. Because of the similarity of
the issues involved in these two bodies of cases, many of the
comments and criticisms apply equally to both. Thus evaluation
of the area of recognition will be withheld and discussed in
conjunction with the act of state doctrine.

B. ACT OF STATE
The so-called act of state doctrine was given its classic ex50
pression by Chief Justice Fuller in Underhill v. Hernandez:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of another done within its own
territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves. 51
The cases involving application of the act of state doctrine reveal
that it was originally conceived as an accommodation with the
executive to be employed in cases where that branch's policy
preference was either unexpressed or unascertainable. 52 In such
cases the judiciary took a hands-off attitude and left the aggrieved party to seek a remedy through direct appeal to the
executive. 53 In a manner entirely consistent with the defer50. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
51. Id. at 252.
52. See, e.g., Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1919). The commentators are in accord
that act of state is not a doctrine of international law. See generally
Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 A.m. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959).
53. Thus in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), the court said:
It was because of apprehension that decisions on the merits
concerning acts of confiscation by foreign governments might
embarrass the political branches in conducting foreign relations and adversely affect the national interests in that area
that the court adopted the policy of abstention.
Id. at 975.
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ential nature of the doctrine, an exception to act of state was
forged by Judge Learned Hand in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Fr6r~s Soci6t6 Anonyme.54 In that case, plaintiff was attempting to recover property which had been seized from him by the
Nazi government of Germany. The State Department offered
no policy guidance. Judge Hand held that no relief could be
granted because the executive silence could not be construed as
"positive evidence" of a desire not to employ the act of state
doctrine.5 5 Several years later, the plaintiff, following his property into different hands, brought another action.5 6 In this
case the State Department broke its silence, by informing the
court that it was the policy of the United States to free the
57
judiciary from any restraint in exercising its jurisdiction.
The court, although finding for the defendant, forged the socalled Bernstein exception, stating that the executive's letter
relieved the court from the compulsion of the act of state
doctrine.
The principle of deference illustrated by the Bernstein cases
has recently been judicially extended in the much discussed
case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.58 There, the
issue was the effect to be given a Cuban nationalization decree.
The Court, although confronted with unequivocal statements
54. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
55. In order to do justice to Judge Hand's decision, it should be
noted that as a further rationale for the result, it was observed that
reparations proceedings against Nazi confiscations were underway, and
that it was not clear that plaintiff would be denied compensation in
those proceedings. Id. at 250.
56. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche StoomvaartMaatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
57. The policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in the United States for the restitution of identifiable
property (or compensation in lieu thereof) lost through force,
coercion, or duress as a result of Nazi persecution in Germany,
is to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of acts of
Nazi officials.
Id. at 376. It was clear when this letter was written that the reparations proceedings had failed to compensate plaintiff for his loss. See
note 55 supra.
58. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). This case generated a tremendous body of
literature both before and after it reached the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
E. MoONEY, FOREIGN SEIZURES:

TRINE (1967); L.

TONDEI,,

SABBATnNTO AM T= ACT OF STATE DocArTERmATH oF SABRATNO (1965);

JR., THE

Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participationof Domestic Courts in the
InternationalLegal Orders: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1961); Henkin, The Foreign Affairs
Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 805 (1964);
Note, The Castro Government in American Courts: Sovereign Immunity
and the Act of State Doctrine, 75 HARv. L. IEv. 1607 (1962).
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from the State Department that the Cuban decrees violated
international law, 9 held that the act of state doctrine precluded
examination of the acts of Cuba.60 In effect, the Sabbatino
Court went to such lengths to stay out of the field of foreign
affairs that the result was a refusal to effectuate an ascertainable
State Department preference. It is not surprising that the decision was poorly received both by commentators' 1 and the
Congress. The latter responded with the so-called Hickenlooper
Amendment0 2 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 196463 providing:
... no court in the United States shall decline on the ground
of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on
the merits giving effect to the principles of international law
in a case in which a claim of title ...is asserted by any party
... based upon. . .a confiscation... in violation of the principles of internation law .... 64

The State Department, which had apparently been satisfied in
its relationship with the judiciary prior to Sabbatino, 5 vocally
opposed passage of this Amendment. Secretary of State Rusk
told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the bill would
do little for the great majority of victims of foreign expropriations since their property rarely comes within the jurisdiction of
domestic courts. Furthermore, he argued, the piecemeal ad59. 376 U.S. at 402-03. The State Department's expression of preference came in the form of two letters to the Court of Appeals. The
letters described the expropriation as "manifestly in violation of those
principles of international law which have long been accepted by the
free countries of the West. It is in its essence discriminatory, arbitrary
and confiscatory." Id.
60. In the course of its opinion the Court said:
The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong
sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of
passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather
than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and
for the community of nations as a whole in the international
sphere.
Id. at 423.
61. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 58, at 823, where the author asks:
Despite Justice Harlan's reliance on "the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of
powers," would not a judicial power rooted in the fact that
foreign relations are in the federal domain, i.e., principally the
President's domain, be subordinate to policy as determined by
the President?
62. The amendment was named after its sponsor, Sen. Bourke B.
Hickenlooper, R.-Iowa.
63. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 301(d) (4), 78 Stat. 1013, as
amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (e)(2) (Supp. II, 1965).
64. Id. This passage was qualified by a provision to the effect that
courts should refrain from acting under the amendment if the State Department so indicated.

65. See 6 M.

WHiTEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw

1 (1968).
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judications might very well compromise the State Department's
position in negotiating with the foreign expropriator for mass
compensation of American victims.0
However, Secretary Rusk's
pleas for the retention of the alleged flexibility which had
characterized the relationship with the courts before Sabbatino
6 7
fell on deaf ears and the amendment became law.
The relationship between the judiciary and executive, illustrated by the recognition and act of state cases discussed above,
shares most of the characteristics of the relationship as it has
developed in the sovereign immunity area.6 8 This consistency,
if not desirable, is at least understandable. In dealing with
recognition and acts of foreign states, the courts have tended to
regard their position as potentially disruptive to the conduct of
foreign affairs. This view has been fostered, in large part, by
the frequency of executive intervention and the ease with which
inferences of State Department preference can be drawn. The
courts, above all else, wish to avoid embarrassing the executive
in its conduct of foreign relations, and their sensitivity to this
possibility is evident notwithstanding the apparent pettiness of
the stakes involved.6 9 To avoid such embarrassment, the court
has developed broad rules of self-limitation in the case of rec0
ognition and of abstention in the case of foreign acts or decrees.
The promulgation of such rules is more understandable in these
areas than in the field of sovereign immunity because there is no
widespread international agreement as to the legal consequences
of recognition of foreign decrees. 71 *Faced with this uncertainty,
the courts have taken the fork in the road leading to abdication
rather than creation. Some believe the choice has been wisely
made:
When sovereign power exercised within one's own territory is
66. Id. at 28.
67. See Hearings on H.R. 7750 Before the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1239 (1965).
68. See notes 4-36 supra, and accompanying text.
69. Cf. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), where
the opposite result would have deprive6. Mexico's vendee of a load of
animal hides.
70. The effect of the attempted abrogation of the rule of abstention
by the Hickenlooper Amendment, note 63 supra, is not yet clear. In
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), decided after passage of the amendment, the court refused to make an
independent determination as to the effect of a Cuban confiscatory decree. Instead, it stayed the case and sought express guidance from the
State Department. This approach seems likely to be the wave of the
future in act of state cases.
71. Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts:
*Sabbatino,64 CoLOm. L. REv. 805, 832 (1964).
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brought into question elsewhere, sensibilities are offended. Thepower value is at stake for the national community concerned,
and, in terms of precedent, for those who question it as well. To
undo what another state has officially done obviously involves
inter-sovereign relationships, and can be justified-if at allonly where fundamental standards of substantive of procedguidural due process have been violated. Absent diplomatic
72
ance, there is a real question of judicial competency.
It is further argued that the present relationship is justified in
this area because of the overriding importance of the principle
that the United States should speak with one voice in foreign
affairs.7 3 It is also said, as it is in the sovereign immunity
cases, 74 that the piecemeal, fortuitous nature of the judicial
process is unsuited to the development of universally respected
norms of international lawJ 5 An active, developmental role for
the courts, it is urged, is unnecessary because the long-term
self-interest of all members of the world community militates
in favor of internationally lawful conduct. Thus, the disruptions
that could be caused by judicial attempts to create substantive
norms should be avoided pending the development of new legal
principles and law-applying institutions by political leaders.76
The force of the considerations enumerated above lends an
air of rationality to the relationship between the executive and
the courts in the areas of recognition and act of state which was
notably absent in the sovereign immunity field.7 7 Yet, it seems
those considerations suffer from shortsightedness and over-sensitivity. The present relationship between the State Department
72. Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims
and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087,
1153 (1956). The same author, in oral argument in Sabbatino made the
following statement:
The external arena of politics is a much better forum in which
to effect changes in international law ...
Judicial decisions
would be a "deadening weight" on the development of international law.
32 U.S.L.W. 3157 (Oct. 29, 1963). The contention that politics provide a
more "external arena" than open court seems at best questionable.
73.

H.

LAUTERPACHT,

OPPENHEnM'S INTERNATIONAL

LAW

685

n.4

(6th ed. 1947) (the author restricts his approval of application of the
"single voice" theory to statements of fact); International Law in the
National Courts in THmi SUMMER CONFERENCE ON INT'L L. 17-18 (1960)
(remarks of Justice Halpern); Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State
Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to
Usurper, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 498 (1963).
74. See note 23 supra,and accompanying text.
75. KAPLAN & KATZENBACH at 14; Bilder, The Office of the Legal
Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 Am. J.
INT'L L. 633, 668 (1962).
76. KAPLAN & KATZENBACH at 10, 29.
77. See notes 21-38 supra,and accompanying text.
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and the judiciary denies to the latter any significant role in the
creation of substantive norms. Such a denial is adverse to what
must admittedly be the ultimate objective of all our efforts in
Much has been
the international sphere-self-preservation.
written, and many words spoken, to the effect that thermonuclear
holocaust can only be averted by the development of norms of
conduct by which men and nations can live in peace. Those who
contend that the judicial process is too piecemeal and fortuitous
to be an effective vehicle for the development of norms seem to
forget that the courts are among a very small number of institutions to which there is a relatively steady flow of international legal problems. It is easy to say that the promotion of
such rules is for the executive; but history bears witness to the
paltry success of that branch. The development of norms is
the responsibility of all men and all institutions to whom or to
which an opportunity is presented. The courts are obviously
such institutions. Indeed, the relatively dispassionate and analytic nature of court proceedings would seem an ideal setting for
the promulgation of relatively nonpartisan norms. Courts do
not shy away from the balancing of competing policies in domestic cases; they attempt to ascertain and promote the national

interest.

Yet in the international realm, the courts, with the

encouragement of the executive, have virtually declared themselves incompetent. 78 Such a distinction seems anomalous in a
contemporary international context which logically compels a
merger of the national with the international interest.
Turning, as we did in the discussion of sovereign immunity,
to a less philosophical and more pragmatic approach, it can be
seen that the very nature of the cases that reach domestic courts
is such that their independent resolution would result in no
short or long range harm to the national interest. The power of
domestic courts is necessarily limited by territorial boundaries.
Unless a foreign party has property within the confines of the
United States he cannot be affected by domestic court decrees.
The cases show that the type and value of foreign-owned property located in the United States, the title or right to which has
78. ... how decisions by American courts may be viewed
abroad should be irrelevant; it should not lightly be assumed
that the courts will not make "dispassionate applications of neutral international principles.. . ." While the acting state is not
likely to regard such a decision as purely objective, other states
surely cannot be insensitive to the justness of a decision disallowing effect to confiscations which are retaliatory, discriminatory, and without adequate compensation.
Brief for Respondent at 27, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964).

19681

EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIARY

been litigated, is relatively insignificant. 79 It therefore seems
apparent that both the courts and the executive grossly overestimate the impact which independent adjudication would
have on foreign affairs.
IV.

TREATY INTERPRETATION

As has been shown, the relationship between the State Department and the courts in cases involving sovereign immunity,
recognition, and act of state is predominantly characterized by a
deferential attitude of the judiciary. It has been observed that
most of the cases in these areas require the courts to adjudicate,
either directly or indirectly, the rights or obligations of foreign
sovereigns. In cases involving treaty interpretation,"0 on the
other hand, the courts are often asked to adjudicate what must
be considered as purely private rights. In addition, the Constitution of the United States expressly extends the judicial
power to cases arising under treaties. 8 ' These two factors,
which distinguish treaty interpretation from sovereign immunity, recognition and act of state, have significantly contributed
to a modification of the executive-dominated relationship observed in the latter areas.
A study of the cases, however, reveals that the deferential
attitude toward the executive, although modified, is by no means
abandoned in the area of treaty interpretation. A number of
cases have taken the view that acts of the executive with respect
to the meaning of treaties should, when ascertainable, be given
nearly conclusive effect.8 2 Other cases take a different view of
judicial responsibility and take pains to employ legal reasoning
79. Thus, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964), all the statements about the pernicious effect on foreign relations,
which a denial of validity of the Cuban decree would have, were made
with reference to a fund amounting to less than $150,000. See also
note 69 supra.
80. This discussion will confine itself to judicial interpretation of
treaties and will not deal with executive agreements. The latter are
entered into without the consent of the Senate and only infrequently
come before the courts for interpretation. One reason may be that the
executive agreement seldom attempts to set up a detailed scheme of
legal rights unless it is executed pursuant to the provisions of a general
treaty or act of Congress.
81.

U.S. CoNsT.

art. IDI § 2.

82. See Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921); Charlton v.
Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); United States v. Reid, 73 F.2d 153, 156 (9th
Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 544 (1936); United States v. Ushi
Shiroma, 123 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D. Hawaii 1954); Union of Soviet Socialist Republics v. National City Bank, 41 F. Supp. 353 (S.D. N.Y. 1941);
In re Taylor, 118 F. 196, 199 (D. Mass. 1902).
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to reach the correct result.,3 This inconsistency is clearly revealed by comparison of two cases involving the same legal
issue. Gallina v. Fraser 4 raised the question of whether the
extradition treaty of 1885 with Italy8 5 had been abrogated by
World War II. In the course of holding that the treaty was still
in force the court said:
Oftentimes the intrinsic nature of an agreement made by the
political department of one government with that of another
nation is revealed only by subsequent conduct and relations
between those political departments, for the nature lies not in
the bare words of the treaty but in the gloss put on those
words by the authorities bound thereto. Our courts have always acknowledged the pre-eminent role of the political departments in interpreting the obligations of this nation or a contracting nation under a treaty or other type of international
agreement.8 6
The contrasting approach was taken in Clark v. Allen, 87 a
case which also questioned the effect of war on a treaty. One
Wagner died in California leaving his real and personal property to German nationals. When World War II commenced the
property was seized by the Alien Property Custodian pursuant
to the Trading With The Enemy Act.88 The Custodian brought
an action to have the German legatees declared ineligible to
participate in the estate. The Custodian based his petition on
the theory that the 1923 treaty with Germany,89 at least as far
as it pertained to reciprocal inheritance rights, was abrogated by
the war. The Supreme Court, speakhag through Justice Douglas,
disagreed and held that the treaty remained in force. The Court
83.

See Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377

(1948);

Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407 (1886) (the Court looked to the views of "publicists and
writers" to determine the substantive rule of international law); Smiths
America Corp. v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 140 F. Supp. 46 (D.D.C. 1956).
See also United States ex rel. Casanova v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), where the court, called upon to interpret the U.N. Headquarters Agreement and faced with a State flepartment interpretation,
said:
Whether, upon the facts presented by both the Government,
and the individual involved or his government, immunity exists by reason of the agreement, is not a political question, but
a justiciable controversy involving the interpretation of the
agreement and its application to the particular facts.
Id. at 433.
84. 177 F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959), affd, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.
1960).
85. Supplementary Convention of 1885, 24 Stat. 1001, amending
Convention of 1868, 15 Stat. 629.

86.

177 F. Supp. at 863-64.

87. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
88. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-5 (1967).
89. 44 Stat. 2132 (1923).
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drew from prior decisions the principle that war does not
automatically abrogate all treaties between the parties to the
conflict.°0 Reasoning from that principle hte Court examined
the compatibility of the inheritance provisions with the fact of
war:
Where the relevant historical sources and the instrument itself
give no plain indication that it is to become inoperative in whole
or in part on the outbreak of war, we are left to determine...
whether the provision under which rights are asserted is incompatible with national policy in time of war.91

The difference in approach illustrated by the two cases
above is testimony to the difficulty the courts have had in
forging a consistent role for themselves in treaty interpretation.
The difficulty may be due in part to the lack of widely accepted
norms of interpretation. Thus in the examples above, it is
generally agreed that the compatibility of a treaty with a state
of war is an important factor in determining its continued
vitality; but there is no such agreement concerning the kinds of
factors that tend to establish compatibility. 92 As we have seen,
the dearth of norms in the field of recognition and act of state
triggered judicial deference to the State Department. The same
reaction, different only in degree, 3 is present in treaty interpretation. The somewhat less extensive degree of deference
may perhaps be explained by the involvement in many of the
cases of essentially private rights.9 4 But the presence of this
90. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823). The Court in this case said:
There may be treaties of such a nature, as to their object and
import, as that war will put an end to them; but where treaties
contemplate a permanent arrangement of territorial and other
national rights, or which, in their terms, are meant to provide
for the event of an intervening war, it would be against every
principle of just interpretation to hold them extinguished by
the event of war.
Id. at 494.
91. 331 U.S. at 513-14.
92. See generally Rank, Modern War and the Validity of Treaties:
A Comparative Study, 38 CORNEL L.Q. 321 (1953).
93. It should be noted in the passage quoted that Justice Douglas
sought the compatibility of the treaty with national policy, rather than
with general international practice.
94. Irving Moskovitz expressed his concern with this factor in the
following way:
It would give me some concern to think that the rights of a
private person can be influenced by the creation of a kind of a
precedent of authority merely by the assertion of a position.
My recollection, from personal experience, is that in the course
of the performance of one's function as a representative of the
executive, one tends to argue one's position as if it were almost
an Act of Congress.
International Law in the National Courts in Tnnw Sunmnm CONFERENCE ON INT'L L. 44 (1960).
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factor has not deterred the courts from stating in almost every
case that the interpretation placed on a particular treaty by the
State Department is entitled to great weight.0 5 When the court
is referring to a course of interpretation consistently adhered
to by both contracting parties, this statement seems entirely
proper. 6 When the court looks to a unilateral statement of
interpretation, however, there is serious doubt about the degree
of reliance which is called for. Under the Constitution, a treaty
must receive the advice and consent of the Senate as well as the
signature of the executive before it becomes a part of the law of
the land.9 7 Thus, when a court looks to the executive for an
interpretation, it cannot accurately be said that it is looking to
the United States' interpretation. :It is not inconceivable that
the meaning placed on a treaty by the executive might differ
materially from that placed upon it by the consenting Senators."
Thus, in looking at a State Department interpretation, the courts
should logically give it no more weight than they give such
things as administrative regulations.
The confusion in the relationship between courts and executive in the treaty interpretation area has been compounded by a
recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. In
the case of Zschernig v. Miller,99 a resident of Oregon died
intestate leaving both real and personal property located in
that state. Defendants, decedent's sole heirs and residents of
East Germany, sought to inherit the property under the provisions of the 1923 treaty with Germany. 100 Plaintiffs, officials
of the government of Oregon, petitioned the probate court for
escheat of the proceeds of the estate on the theory that an
Oregon statute'01 prohibited the devolution of the estate to the
East German nationals. The state law conditioned the ability of
aliens to inherit Oregon property on the presence of a reciprocal
right for United States citizens, and the ability of the foreign
heirs to take the property without confiscation. The Oregon
Supreme Court held that the conditions of the statute had been
95. See, e.g., Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1958).
96. It is elementary contract doctrine that the meaning which the
parties to a contract have placed upon the instrument by their subsequent conduct is entitled to great weight. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 235(e) (1932).
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.

98. The recent controversy over the scope of the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution, although not a treaty, is evidence of such a contingency.
99. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).

100. 44 Stat. 2132 (1923).
101. ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1965).
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met and accordingly that the East German heirs were entitled to
the property under the 1923 treaty.1 0 2 The Supreme Court of
the United States, speaking through Justice Douglas, reversed,
holding that the Oregon law was an unconstitutional intrusion
into the federal domain of foreign affairs. In reaching this result, the Court ignored a direct communication from the State
Department to the effect that the Oregon law was in no way an
impediment to the conduct of foreign relations, nor was it prohibited by the 1923 treaty as read by the Department. Despite
these assurances, Justice Douglas said of the Oregon statute:
...
it has more than "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries," and its great potential for disruption or embarto place it in the category of a
rassment makes us hesitate
diplomatic bagatelle.103
The judicial independence exhibited by the Court's refusal to be
swayed by the State Department's communication with regard
to the scope of the 1923 treaty, although susceptible to misinterpretation, is not surprising; nor is it likely to foreshadow a
change from the somewhat deferential attitude which has been
noted above. In reality, the Court's holding was not based on an
interpretation of the 1923 treaty at all; but rather on a relatively
detached evaluation of the Oregon statute as an entirely unconnected piece of legislation.1 0 4 The Court, in effect, held that
regardless of any treaty commitments, the state law was an
impermissible intermeddling into a field reserved for the federal
branches. 05 The Court, in a somewhat questionable fashion,
was merely adopting its traditional posture as umpire of the
federal system. These considerations lead to the conclusion that
Zschernig v. Miller, although perhaps adding more confusion to
an area already fraught with it, is not authoritative precedent for
a readjustment of the relationship between executive and judiciary in matters of treaty interpretation.
102. The court's decision limited the aliens' right of inheritance to
the proceeds from the realty. This result was dictated by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the 1923 treaty in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503
(1947).
103. 389 U.S. at 434-35.
104. This approach was vigorously condemned by the concurring
opinions of Justices Harlan and Stewart (joined by Justice Brennan)
and the dissenting opinion of Justice White.
105. The several States, of course, have traditionally regulated
the descent and distribution of estates. But those regulations
must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy.
389 U.S. at 440. Notice here that the Oregon law is said to impair the
nation's policy although the State Department unequivocally said that
this was not the case.
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It has been observed that the tr7end of the future is likely
to be characterized by a decreasing role for the treaty as a device
for setting up substantive rules of conduct. The treaty is simply
too ponderous a vehicle for the effective accomplishment of this
goal. Instead, it is said, the treaty will increasingly be employed
to establish broad, constitutional procedures through which such
rules can be promulgated by use of the executive agreement and
other forms of negotiation. 10 6 Although such an approach seems
clearly desirable, it is not at hand and the courts are still frequently faced with the problem of enforcing international rights
and obligations under treaties. In discharging this responsibility,
it is submitted, that the courts' acquiescence to the State Department's preference should be conditioned on the results of an
independent legal appraisal. There is no justification for behaving in a deferential manner when the issue is whether the
United States or other party to a treaty has complied with the
terms of the instrument, 0 T and then turning around to assert
judicial independence when predominantly private rights are
concerned. 0 8 Such a pattern of behavior must naturally call
into question the objectivity of United States courts in foreign
eyes. It is also, as the cases show, unnecessary and even
deleterious to the effective conduct of foreign relations.

V. CONCLUSION
As the relationship between the courts and the State Department has been traced through -the areas of sovereign immunity, recognition and act of state, and treaty interpretation,
one overriding characteristic has come to light. Whenever there
is any possibility, however remote, of embarrassing the executive
in its conduct of foreign affairs or of giving offense to a foreign
nation, the courts of the United States will look to the executive
branch for guidance, and will consider themselves essentially
bound by that branch's expressions of preference. Down
through the years there have been indications from the State
Department itself that it does not seek to play the role which
has devolved upon it. 109 Yet its own intervention in cases
106. KAPLAN & KATZENBACH at 246.
107. See, e.g., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics v. National City

Bank, 41 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).

108. See, e.g., Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
109. See, e.g., Memorandum for U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 25, Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); cf. Republic of
Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 241 F. Supp. 567, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
affd, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
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where it was patently unnecessary, and judicial oversensitivity
to the requirements of amicable intercourse between nations,
have combined to forge the relationship as it stands today.
That the relationship is unsatisfactory, both from the standpoint
of the national interest in fostering the growth of international
law and from the standpoint of the foreign litigant in a domestic
court, has already been argued. The possibility of altering the
present relationship in the direction of judicial independence
seems remote. Deference to the executive has become enshrined
in the courts and it is highly unlikely that any change will come
from them. The only practical means of achieving a significant
alteration appears to be a State Department declaration of and
strict adherence to a policy of avoiding the judicial role. Such
a policy, of course, could not and should not prevent the executive from interceding, in the unlikely event that a truly sensitive
case reached a domestic court. But the State Department should
look long and hard at the overall picture before taking such a
step.

